Doctor of Political Sciences Armen Ayvazyan writes on his Facebook page:
"Discussions on the issue of who, which political forces and figures are to blame for the devastating defeat of Armenia during the 44-day war, have been revived among us in recent days. As always, the "former" and "present", as well as the propaganda teams serving them, put forward old and new theses and arguments against each other, many of which, by the way, are really true and valid. However, the problem is that these criticisms are one-sided and extremely biased.
The reality is: In addition to external powerful forces, the 1991 Since then, all the leaders of Armenia and their political forces, each in his own measure. Of course, the main culprit is 2018-2025. the current collaborative government headed by Nikol Pashinyan.
Nevertheless, below I present the list of immediate internal reasons that led to the tragic end of the war, which I published on FB in 2021. on January 25 (link in the comments) and which is still completely current.
"THE INTERNAL CAUSES OF ARMENIA'S DEFEAT
Even a month ago, I prepared a preliminary summary for myself, about the internal reasons for Armenia's defeat in the last Artsakh war. After making some additions and corrections, I present it to the public as well, although the list is incomplete and needs further processing. External causes of defeat are not discussed in this paper.
My hypothesis, built on the basis of numerous information and analyses, is that the war proceeded according to a carefully prepared and agreed-upon scenario with the RA leadership, the end result of which should have been the fall of Shushi, the shameful capitulation of RA, the loss of its vitality and sovereignty, the entry of Russian troops into Artsakh, the embodiment of the daily Azerbaijani-Turkish threat hanging over Syunik's head. On the Armenian side, the military and political top management of the Republic of Armenia made this end result willy-nilly. Special destructive measures have been carried out for years, both in the pre-war and war stages. They have not stopped even now.
The PRE-WAR PHASE was completely controlled from outside. For years, the puppet leadership of the Republic of Armenia deliberately disregarded the obviously necessary military, political, economic and propaganda steps and measures in the field of defense.
Thus, the leaders and governments of the Republic of Armenia, one after the other,
1. They spared no effort to prepare a large army reserve force, which would fill the ranks of the regular army within the first 24-48 hours of the war.
2. They did not build modern and high-quality fortifications either on the front line of Artsakh or in the depth of the front and the entire country.
3. They ignored the well-known acquisitions of the latest weapons of the enemy's army and did not take the necessary countermeasures, citing insufficient financial resources as the reason.
4. They deliberately overturned the creation and development of the domestic military industry for years.
5. They criminally turned a blind eye not only to Turkey's violent anti-Armenian hostile policy, but also to the possibility of direct participation of the Turkish army in the planned invasion of Azerbaijan.
6. The vital strategic importance of every square kilometer of the liberated territory was never explained to the officers of the Armenian army, diplomatic corps and civil servants. They did not demand that those elite sections of the society direct all their efforts to the protection of the land rights of the Armenian side. Instead, "compromise" solutions were CONSTANTLY preached to all of them at the STATE LEVEL, by which it was planned to unilaterally hand over the 5+2 regions that make up the military and strategic security backbone of Armenia to Azerbaijan. That sermon, to which the palace "intellectuals" were also engaged, was seasoned with Serzh's famous "Aghdam is not our homeland" and similar capitulant theses.
7. They did not organize an Armenian rally, did not give a boost to repatriation, so that, apart from everything else, the Armenian Army would have a sufficient number of men at the time of need. On the contrary, emigration was encouraged at the highest state level and promoted on Armenian TV channels for decades, including the (self)deceptive statement that the homeland can be "helped more effectively from outside".
8. Serzh Sargsyan and RPA in 2008-2009. conducted the so-called "football diplomacy" with the Turkish genocidaires and signed the first capitulation of RA, the humiliating Armenian-Turkish protocols, which TRAINED the RA STATE SYSTEM to MASS TREASON against national interests. That betrayal prepared the ground for 2020. for the treacherous capitulation of Artsakh (here is just one of my many critical articles in those years, where the destructive consequences of the pseudo-Nzhdehs' flirtation with Turkey are mentioned: http://blog.ararat-center.org/?p=380).
9. In the last two and a half decades, the puppet political leadership of RA did not understand the vital value and importance of the liberated land for the creation and survival of the Armenian nation-state, never adopting a consistent policy to protect and resettle that living space at any cost.
Among the treacherous steps, actions and criminal inactivity of the Pashinyan junta, the following actions should be included immediately before the war and during the war itself.
1) In the pre-war period, the Pashinyan junta did everything in the direction of diverting the public's attention to secondary and tertiary issues, causing intra-Armenian divisions and exacerbating the existing ones.
2) The Junta completely destroyed the already weak and vulnerable RA national security system. In particular, the activities of the National Security Service were almost completely neutralized in a deliberate manner, by directing the service completely to the performance of police functions and by making frequent changes in its leadership.
3) Instead of new and latest necessary weapons, the junta made large-scale purchases of physically and morally worn-out weapons and ammunitions that were physically and morally worn out, unsuitable for our conditions and needs, or outright useless (the SU-30s, which did not work during the war, and the outdated anti-aircraft systems brought from Jordan) are a vivid example of this.
4) The personnel massacre, large-scale and frequent changes in the general management of the troops caused confusion, disorganization and a decline in discipline.
5) There is also information that just 2-3 days before the war, several dozen experienced officers serving in the middle ranks of the Defense Forces, without any reason, received an order to write an urgent resignation letter and leave the army (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vg69FdMyAKI).
6) No preventive (превентивный) or preemptive (упреждающий) strike was made after being reliably informed about the imminent imminent attack of the enemy. In this way, the Azerbaijani army had to be deprived of the great advantage of striking first, causing confusion and mistrust in its ranks. According to Samvel Babayan, the former secretary of the National Security Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in the first 15 minutes of the Azerbaijani attack, half of the anti-aircraft and 40 percent of the artillery of the Artsakh Defense Army were destroyed. The preemptive strike of the Armenian army would have prevented those huge losses and the initiative would have passed into our hands, at least temporarily. Let's note that the vital importance of a preventive strike was outwardly recognized and accepted in the new "Tonyan" defense doctrine of RA, but at the crucial moment this commitment was treacherously violated.
7) During the war, general military mobilization was not held on the territory of RA, therefore, the army did not receive the required number of men.
Moreover, the organization of the general military mobilization in Artsakh also failed, because thousands of adult men were allowed to leave for Armenia from the very first days of the war.
9) The RA economy and all life activities were not put on military bases, thus the country and the national population were not prepared for a longer war.
10) The command vertical was also disrupted during the war. The circle of those issuing contradictory and mixed orders was absurdly wide. Orders were issued by various high-ranking representatives of the military and civilian authorities: the prime minister of the Republic of Armenia and his wife, who are insane in military matters, the head of the General Staff of the Republic of Armenia, the President of the Republic of Artsakh, the commander of the Armed Forces, unofficial military figures, the heads of the administrative regions of Armenia and others.
11) The call of the Pashinyan junta on October 21 to create volunteer squads on the basis of party and local government bodies instead of forming an army reserve force and the subsequent fanciful "efforts" undertaken in that direction (for example, the creation of "Erato", Hayk Marutyun, Gagik Tsarukyan and other demonstration squads) should be evaluated as a blatant betrayal of creating artificial confusion and destroying the front. steps.
12) Reservists and volunteers were very often sent to the front line unorganized, unprepared and even without a command. And on the spot, they were often deprived of the means of communication with the neighboring military units and detachments and basic understanding of the military situation.
13) The recruitment of volunteers from the Diaspora, their arrival in Armenia and their effective inclusion in the RA Armed Forces were not properly organized.
14) In many cases, the military specialists who voluntarily presented themselves at military commissariats (whom the army felt the need for) were simply sent home, saying that "they will be called later".
15) The powerful "Iskander" type missile systems in the Armenian arsenal were never used. In particular, they did not attack the enemy's airfields and command posts, allowing him to establish absolute dominance in the sky.
16) No adequate response was given to the bombing and shelling of Stepanakert, Shushi, other settlements of Artsakh.
17) Armenian troops withdrew from a number of strategic, political and symbolic settlements with criminal orders from above. In particular, Hadrut, Karintak and Shushi surrendered to the enemy in that way. Furthermore, later, Armenian units were not allowed to attack and retake those settlements (see, in particular, https://www.aravot.am/2020/12/03/1156564/; https://www.aravot.am/2020/12/15/1159291/;
About the surrender of Karintak and Shushi: https://news.am/arm/news/614232.html; https://168.am/2021/01/17/1445806.html).
18) The Armenian command, in fact, did not undertake any major counter-offensive operations, voluntarily and completely handing over the initiative to the enemy. On the other hand, there were quite serious grounds and sufficient conditions for organizing counter-attacks.
19) The total disinformation provided by the RA official media about the course of the war, with loud shouts of "We will win" and putting other soft pillows under the heads of the people, did not allow the healthy forces of the society to understand in time the extreme danger of the situation and to try to prevent the imminent disaster.
20) In the forest and mountain zone of Artsakh, as well as in the settlements itself, it was possible to resist very effectively with the weapons that the Armenian Army had, and in case of shortage, it could be quickly replenished. We are talking about small-caliber mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft portable (including the newest) systems ("Cornet", "Verba", etc.), machine automatic grenade launchers (АГС, etc.), heavy machine guns (ДШК, etc.), other types of firearms. That way, one could resist for a very long time. It was possible and it was necessary to give a boost to the activity of subversive-intelligence groups. At the end of October, the enemy's offensive resources were running out and he began to lose his confidence. Therefore, it was necessary to fight until the enemy was exhausted, instead of surrendering with such disastrous consequences. And as for the fact that Stepanakert would be surrounded and our army would be massacred, then these are empty rumors. Every move of the enemy could be countered with own countermeasures, including street fighting in Stepanakert itself, and in extreme cases even the surrender of Stepanakert and an organized retreat. But it was never possible to resort to complete capitulation and handing over regions of invaluable strategic importance: Karvachar, Vorotan (Ghubatlu) and Kovsakan (Zangelan).
Instead of signing a capitulation, all you had to do was tell the truth about the situation on the front, get the people up, inspire and organize them, replace illiterate generals with literate ones, invite military advisers from outside and, most importantly, fight until the last chance, regardless of whether Shushi or Stepanakert would fall or not. Also, regardless of how many casualties we would have, because the enemy would have suffered greater losses. At that time, Shushi would not have fallen or retreated quickly, as he had already retreated once. Armenia would also have a chance to survive as a (semi) independent state. Syunik would not become an extremely vulnerable target either. Understand, even if Yerevan was bombed, the fight had to continue. Only then would we have decent peace and great and promising opportunities for development.
And now everything has to start from a much lower point."
