The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Republic of Armenia has published the 2025 annual report on the external risks of the Republic of Armenia in Armenian and English.
The year 2024 was marked by the intensity of bilateral high-level meetings, contacts and written communication, mainly touching on the normalization of relations, agreement on the text of the peace agreement, border demarcation and demarcation, de-blocking of infrastructure, humanitarian and other issues.
Most likely, in 2025, the bilateral formats of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan on various issues will continue to be the most effective of those experienced by these parties. Based on the analysis of various facts, information and phenomena, as of the moment of publication of this report, we do not estimate the probability of a large-scale military attack by Azerbaijan against Armenia.
At the same time, in the absence of peace and interstate relations, as part of the Azeri policy toolkit of threats of force against Armenia, the risk of local tensions and escalation will continue to exist on the border, the guarantee of a certain reduction of which can be the smooth continuation of the demarcation and demarcation process that started in 2024, according to the mutually approved procedure. .
In this context, the task of the Service is to continuously assess whether Azerbaijan's consistent development and financing of various harmful speeches against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia is a manifestation of "legitimization" of its own intention to use force against Armenia. Among those discourses are the so-called "West Azerbaijan and West Azeris", "armenia militarization", "revanchism", "Zangezur Corridor" discourses.
The delays in the process of peace and normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan significantly increase the uncertainty about Azerbaijan's true intentions regarding the establishment of a lasting peace.
In general, the lack of contractual peace and diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan creates a real risk of maintaining strained interstate relations, which can be further deepened by the influence of alliance rearrangements or transformations of historical alliance relations in the region.
The risks of maintaining tense interstate relations are also increased by Azerbaijan's official/authority aggressive rhetoric, attempts to interfere in Armenia's internal affairs, as well as Azerbaijan's steps to impose its own unilateral demands in the negotiation process by adding various artificial topics. The probability of continuing to use such tools during 2025 remains high.
In 2025, Azerbaijan will continue the pace of development of its offensive capabilities, shortening the period from the political decision at the highest level to the start of combat operations on the ground.
Within this framework, Azerbaijan will continue the work of transferring more mobile units, preparing their reserve, acquiring and importing new weapons, as well as updating military infrastructure.
